Pressing Issues

Manchester United fans were treated to a 3-4-3 masterclass at Old Trafford on Sunday. Unfortunately for the Red Devils, it was Oliver Glasner’s Crystal Palace who demonstrated the formation’s many virtues.

Not Learning From Midweek Lessons

Kobbie Mainoo provided a goal and assist playing the number ten role in United’s Europa League win midweek – yet he was selected as a false nine at Old Trafford on Sunday.

In theory, Mainoo’s creativity and technical prowess allow him to drop deeper and offer an extra option in build up. This worked a few times – most notably for Bruno Fernandes’ shot on target early in the second half.

But in practice, as evidenced by Mainoo’s average position (number 37 above), he was left largely isolated for periods of the game. This can be contrasted to Jean-Phillipe Mateta (Palace number 14), whose positioning close to the midfield constantly offered the visitors an outlet.

His heatmap (shown below), indicates that his biggest impacts on the game were not in threatening areas.

Without a clear forward man, United were often caught out and dispossessed in the midfield areas.

One of a 3-4-3’s most vital components tends to be that there is a player who joins the midfield in possession to provide an extra option. Traditionally, Amorim uses a centre-back.

This is evidenved above, with Lisandro Martinez (in possession) holds the ball high up the pitch, presenting Fernandes with space to run into, and allowing four United players to put pressure on FCSB’s defence.

Yet against Palace, Amorim appeared to want Mainoo to serve as this extra option, with the 19-year-old often dropping deep, and the host’s three centre backs remaining flat for large portions of the game.

As a result, United were mostly unable to progress the ball into the final third. Despite holding 67% possession, the hosts made just 13 more final third entries than Palace (64 to 51).

The Palace Press

Mainoo leading the line left United without a physical presence high up the pitch. This played brilliantly into Palace’s hands.

The Eagles confidently went man-to-man for large portions of the game, triggering an aggressive press when the ball was played to one of the wide centre backs.

More often than not, they successfully closed down each of United’s options and forced a long ball – which left the hosts’ physically inferior forwards trying (and failing) to win aerial duels.

Palace picked their moments well – they were happy to retreat on defensive transition, but clearly fancied their chances of turning the ball over when United tried to build from the back.

Disastrous Defensive Transition

It shouldn’t come as a surprise that two of Palace’s four big chances came on the counterattack.

Palace were repeatedly able to win possession and immediately break through the United midfield to have free reign at the defence. Mateta ran through five players from his own box to put a cross in during the first half.

It is also clear for Palace’s second goal. As much as United were chasing the game at this point, Joshua Zirkzee’s loose pass should trigger United to either counterpress to try and win the ball back high up the pitch, or drop off to limit Palace’s options.

Instead, they do neither. When Jefferson Lerma receives the ball, United have six players behind the ball. Fernandes is tight to Mateta, Dalot has a headstart on Munoz and Lerma has Eriksen close by.

Yet both Munoz and Mateta are left free to run at the United defence, who are caught in no man’s land, resulting in 2-0 and the Theatre of Dreams playing host to another pantomime-style United defeat.

This lack of defensive awareness is simply not good enough for a team supposedly embarking on a rebuild, and will only fuel Amorim’s desire for new personnel further.